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This article analyzes whether market-based financial stability 
indicators (FSIs) should be included in monetary policy models and, if 
so, how.1 Since the economy and interest rates affect financial sector 
credit risk, and the financial sector affects the economy, this article 
builds a model of financial sector vulnerability and integrates it into a 
macroeconomic framework, typically used for monetary policy analysis. 
More specifically, should the central bank explicitly include the financial 
stability indicator in its monetary policy (interest rate) reaction function? 
This is the most important question to be answered in this article. The 
alternative would be to react only indirectly to financial risk by reacting 
to inflation and gross domestic product (GDP) gaps, since they already 
include the effect that financial factors have on the economy.2 
We thank Rodrigo Alfaro, Nicolas Magud, Jorge Chan-Lau, as well as the conference 
participants for useful comments and suggestions.
1. The term FSI used here is an indicator derived from forward-looking market 
information, including indicators from the contingent claims analysis model. It should 
not be confused with the accounting ratio financial stability indicators.
2. An alternative could be designed in which the central bank only reacts directly 
to financial risk whenever the financial stability indicator breaches a predetermined 
threshold.
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The integration of the analysis of financial sector vulnerability 
into macroeconomic models is an area of important and growing 
interest for policymakers, in both developed and emerging markets. 
Monetary policy models and financial stability models, by their 
nature, are very different frameworks. Monetary policy models 
are widely used by central banks to understand the transmission 
mechanisms of interest rates to the macroeconomy and inflation. 
On the other hand, coherently estimating the effect of shocks to 
vulnerability on banks’ risk requires both a model of banking 
sector risk and a tractable methodology for simulating shocks and 
estimating their effect on various risk measures.
Market-based financial stability indicators summarize both 
the credit channel and credit risk transmission from distressed 
borrowers in the economy. Market-based FSIs provide information 
on the banking sector’s financial condition, which is related to the 
quantity of credit extended and the possible or expected effects of 
this channel on the real economy and GDP (that is, credit expansion 
and the financial accelerator).3 Market-based FSIs also capture the 
reduced financial soundness of banks when borrowers default in 
periods of economic distress, which lowers the value of risky debt 
and thus reduces banking sector assets and increases banking asset 
volatility. This is a reflection of the economic condition of borrowers 
and of the real economy. (Note that when the banking sector is in 
distress, bank assets and bank equity values are lower and the 
volatility of bank assets and bank equity is much higher). 
Among the different choices for the market-based FSIs, in 
this paper we use distance to default of the banking system, 
which is an indicator of the riskiness of banks estimated from the 
contingent claims analysis (CCA) tools developed in finance. The 
basis of CCA is that the liabilities of a financial institution or firm 
derive their value from assets that are stochastic. The expected 
variation (volatility) of assets over a future horizon, relative to the 
promised payments on liabilities, provides a measure of financial 
distress risk. CCA methodology is frequently used to estimate the 
probability that an entity (in our case, banks, but also corporations 
or even governments) will default on its obligations. CCA’s explicit 
3. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) introduced financial frictions into a 
business cycle model, starting a fertile field of macroeconomic research. The relation of 
monetary policy and financial stability is discussed in Walsh (2009) and the literature 
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focus on risk and the probability of default or distress and its 
link to market prices of equity have many advantages. Equity 
data by nature incorporate the forward-looking expectations of 
the market in a way that static indicators of bank risk, such as 
nonperforming loan ratios and provisioning, cannot. The high 
frequency of observations, at least for equity and interest rate 
data, allows for much faster updating of risk measures than is 
possible with data that are available only at monthly or quarterly 
frequencies. The CCA financial risk indicators are calculated for 
individual banks and then can be aggregated into a systemwide 
financial stability indicator. 
The CCA systemwide FSI is modeled jointly with a practical 
five-equation dynamic stochastic macroeconomic model used to set 
monetary policy. The macroeconomic model was developed at the 
Central Bank of Chile at the start of the implementation of fully 
fledged inflation targeting in 2000 (García, Herrera, and Valdés, 
2002), and it closely resembles the one proposed by Berg, Karam, 
and Laxton (2006) as a useful toolkit applicable to the analysis 
of monetary policy in many small open economies. As they claim, 
“in the new Keynesian synthesis, there has been a convergence 
between the useful empirically motivated IS/LM models developed 
in several policymaking institutions and dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium approaches that take expectations seriously and are 
built on solid microeconomic foundations.”4 
The specific model used here consists of an equation for the output 
gap (IS), another for inflation (Phillips curve or aggregate supply), 
an equation for the exchange rate (interest parity condition), a yield 
curve relating short- and long-run interest rates, and the Central 
Bank reaction function (Taylor rule). Indeed, the primary tool for 
macroeconomic management is the interest rate set by the central 
bank as a reaction to the deviations of inflation from the target and 
the output gap (Taylor, 1993). Most equations are forward looking 
in the sense that they include the expected levels of the dependent 
variables on the right hand side. 
In addition to the macroeconomic equations, we include a CCA 
module that interacts with the macroeconomic equations, and they 
affect each other in several ways. For instance, the output gap 
includes distance to default as an indicator of financial risk in order 
to analyze whether it is significant or not. Including an aggregate 
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indicator of distance to default—and credit risk in the GDP gap 
equation and testing whether the coefficient is significant is a first 
step to get a better understanding of how financial sector credit 
risk affects GDP. The system is perfectly endogenous given that the 
interest rate and GDP influence the level and volatility of banks 
equity, while at the same time distance to default affects the country 
risk premium, GDP, and the exchange rate. The model contains a 
steady state to which the variables converge, thanks to the reaction 
of monetary authorities. 
Finally, to assess the inclusion of risk indicators in the monetary 
authorities’ reaction function, we construct efficiency frontiers 
mapping inflation and output volatilities after the artificial economy 
is hit with stochastic shocks drawn from a normal distribution. In 
general, we conclude that it is more efficient to include distance to 
default in the reaction function, because it enables the central bank 
to reduce the volatility of both inflation and output. Moving the policy 
interest rate more than is warranted by the gaps of only inflation 
and output is efficient because negative shocks to asset prices and 
liquidity could end up in a credit risk crisis, with negative systemic 
consequences for the financial system and production.5
Section 1 presents the background of CCA distance to default 
and discusses the data used in the analysis. Section 2 lays out the 
macroeconomic framework, as well as the equations required to 
simulate distance to default, which are included in the macroeconomic 
setting. Section 3 presents the results of the simulations, and, section 4 
concludes and presents possible extensions in this line of research. 
1. Risk measuRes fRom ConTingenT Claims analysis
This section introduces the contingent claims approach (CCA), 
which uses forward-looking information to build risk indicators for 
the banking system, and have important implications, for monetary 
policy, as will be clear in the third section This approach provides a 
methodology to combine balance sheet information with widely used 
finance and risk management tools to construct marked-to-market 
balance sheets that better reflect underlying risk. The risk-adjusted 
balance sheets use option pricing tools to value the liabilities, which 
are modeled as claims on stochastic assets. The approach can be 
5. On the other hand, a very large distance to default could reflect bubbles in asset 
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used to derive a set of risk indicators, including distance to default, 
that can serve as barometers of risk for firms, financial sector 
vulnerability, and sovereign risk.
A contingent claim is any financial asset whose future payoff 
depends on the value of another asset. The prototypical contingent 
claim is an option—the right to buy or sell the underlying asset 
at a specified exercise price by a certain expiration date. A call is 
an option to buy, and a put is an option to sell; the value of each 
is contingent on the price of the underlying asset to be bought or 
sold. Contingent claims analysis is a generalization of the option 
pricing theory pioneered by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1973). Since 1973, option pricing methodology has been applied to 
a wide variety of contingent claims. In this paper we focus on its 
application to the analysis of credit risk and guarantees against 
the risk of default, together with their links to macroeconomic and 
financial developments.
The contingent claims approach is based on three principles: 
the values of liabilities are derived from assets; liabilities have 
different priority (that is, senior and junior claims); and assets follow 
a stochastic process. The liabilities consist of senior claims (such 
as senior debt), subordinated claims (such as subordinated debt), 
and junior claims (equity or the most junior claim). For a bank, as 
the value of its total assets decline, the debt that it owes to other 
institutions becomes riskier, and its value declines, while the credit 
spreads on its risky debt rise. 
Balance sheet risk is the key to understanding credit risk and 
the probability of crisis. Default happens when assets cannot service 
debt payments, that is, when assets fall below a distress barrier 
comprising the total value of the firm’s liabilities. Uncertain changes 
in future asset value, relative to promised payments on debt, is the 
driver of default risk. Figure 1 illustrates the key relationships. The 
uncertainty in asset value is represented by a probability distribution 
at time horizon T. At the end of the period, the value of assets may 
be above the promised payments, indicating that debt service can 
be made, or below the promised payments, leading to default. The 
area below the distribution in figure 1 is the “actual” probability 
of default. The asset-return probability distribution used to value 
contingent claims is not the “actual” one, but the risk-adjusted or 
risk-neutral probability distribution, which substitutes the risk-
free interest rate for the actual expected return in the distribution. 
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expected rate of return r, the risk-free rate. Thus, the risk-adjusted 
probability of default calculated using the risk-neutral distribution is 
larger than the actual probability of default for all assets that have 
an actual expected return (µ) greater than the risk-free rate r (that 
is, a positive risk premium).6 
Figure 1: Distribution of Asset Value and Probability of 
Default
Source: Adapted from Gray and Malone (2008).
The actual probability of default can be calculated by combining 
the CCA/Merton model with an equilibrium model of underlying asset 
expected returns to produce estimates that are consistent for expected 
returns on all derivatives, conditional on the expected return on the asset. 
One does not have to know expected returns to use the CCA/Merton 
model for the purpose of value or risk calculations, but such data 
are necessary for calibrating into actual probabilities. The value of 
assets at time t is A(t). The asset return process is 
dA
A
A A dt t = + µ σ ε ,
where µA is the drift rate or asset return, σA is equal to the standard 
deviation of the asset return, and ε is normally distributed, with zero 
mean and unit variance.
6. See Merton (1992, pp. 334–43; 448–50).165 Incorporating Financial Sector Risk into Monetary Policy Models
Default occurs when assets fall to or below the promised 
payments, Bt. Therefore, Bt is the price at which the option is 
exercised. The probability of default is the probability that At ≤ Bt, 
which is 
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is distance to default with a drift of µA and N(•) is the cumulative 
standard normal distribution. 
The probability distribution at time T is shown in figure 1 above 
(dashed line) with drift of the risk-free interest rate, r. The risk-














This is distance to default with a drift of r, the risk-free rate. 
1.1 Calculating Implied Assets and Implied Asset 
Volatility 
The value of assets is unobservable, but it can be implied using 
CCA. In the Merton model for firms, banks, and nonbank financial 
entities with traded equity, use equity, E, equity volatility, σE, and 
the distress barrier in the following two equations to solve for the two 
unknowns A, asset value, and σA, asset volatility (see Crouhy, Galai, 
and Mark, 2000). The first equation is the equation for equity, E, valued 
using the Black-Scholes-Merton formula for pricing call options:
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The second equation relates the volatility and value of equity to the 
implied volatility and value of assets (Merton 1973, 1974):
E A N d E A σ σ = ( ), 1
where d2 was already defined and d d t A 1 2 = +σ   . Since there are two 
equations and two unknowns (asset value, A, and asset volatility, σA), an 
iteration procedure is used to find the values of the unknowns. In practice, 
d1 and d2 can be calculated because they depend on A and σA. 
Financial fragility is intimately related to the probability of 
default. Shocks to prices or liquidity frequently end up being converted 
into credit risk crises, as banks’ debtors see their income flows weaken 
and thus run into difficulties servicing their loans to banks. Default is 
hard to handle in traditional macroeconomic models in part because 
of assumptions that usually exclude such a possibility. In addition, 
flow-of-funds accounts and accounting balance sheets cannot provide 
measures of risk exposures that are forward-looking estimates of 
losses. CCA, on the other hand, is a framework that explicitly includes 
and estimates the probability of default.
Since there is a nonzero chance of default, the value of debt is 
risky and therefore less than the value of risk free debt:
Risky debt + Guarantee against default ≡ Risk-free debt.
The value of risky debt can therefore be modeled as the default-free 
value of the debt less the expected loss:
Risky debt ≡ Risk-free debt - Guarantee against default.
Given that this guarantee is an asset of uncertain value, the debt 
can be thought of and modeled as a contingent claim.
This identity holds both conceptually and in terms of value. If the 
debt is collateralized by a specific asset, then the guarantee against 
default can be modeled as a put option on the asset with an exercise 
price equal to the face value of the debt. The debt holder is offering 
an implicit guarantee, as it is obligated to absorb the losses if there 
is default. However, often a third party is the guarantor, as is the 
case when the government guarantees the deposit liabilities of banks 
or the pension-benefit promises of firms.7 
7. The CCA framework is an extension of Merton’s models of risky debt (1974) and 
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Using the Black-Scholes-Merton differential equation for pricing 
contingent claims (shown above), the value of risky debt is a function 
of the default-free value of debt (that is, the distress barrier) at time 
0, the asset level at time 0, the volatility of the asset, the time horizon 
until the expiration date of the claim, and the risk-free interest rate. 
Since 1973, the Merton methodology has been applied to a wide variety 
of corporations and financial institutions, as well as sovereigns. 
Banks do not frequently default, and regulators are likely to be 
less interested in the probability of such an event than they are in 
the possibility that bank assets will fall below a level at which the 
authorities might be expected to intervene.8 One useful threshold 
is a minimum capital threshold. This barrier would be the default 
barrier plus, say, 8 percent of assets. The CCA model can be used 
in this analysis. This model would give the distance to minimum 
capital as well as the distance to default. Appendix A provides some 
extensions of the CCA model.
1.2 Calculating Risk Indicators for Individual Banks or 
Financial Institutions
Domestic  equity  markets  provide  pricing  and  volatility 
information for the calculation of implied assets and implied asset 
volatility in corporate, bank, and nonbank financial institutions. 
The simplest method solves two equations for two unknowns, asset 
value and asset volatility. Details are shown in Merton (1974) and 
Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2000). Levonian (1991) uses explicit option 
prices on bank equity to measure equity volatility and calibrate 
Merton models for banks. Moody’s KMV has successfully applied its 
version of the CCA model to measure the implied asset values and 
volatilities and to calculate expected default frequencies (EDFs) for 
over 35,000 firms and financial institutions in 55 countries around 
the world (KMV Corporation, 1999 and 2001). 
For unlisted corporate entities and banks, the relationship between 
the accounting information and risk indicators of companies with traded 
equity can be used as a guide for mapping accounting information to 
default probabilities and risk indicators for institutions that do not have 
traded equity. (An example is Moody’s RiskCalc for corporate sectors 
in many countries and for banks in the United States.).
8. The model’s condition of infrequent default was not the case for many banks 
in the subprime crisis.168 D.F. Gray, C.J. García, L. Luna, and J.E. Restrepo
The CCA model for banks and financial institutions uses 
a time series of the daily market capitalization, the volatility 
of the market capitalization, and the distress barrier (derived 
from book values of deposits and debt) to estimate a time series 
of the implied market value of bank assets and asset volatility. 
Several useful risk indicators can be calculated for each bank or 
institution, including distance to default; the risk-adjusted and 
actual probabilities of default; the expected losses (put option) 
to depositors and debt holders; the potential size of public sector 
financial guarantees; and the sensitivity of risk indicators to 
changes in underlying bank assets, asset volatility, or other 
factors. The steps used to calculate the implied assets and asset 
volatility of the individual bank or financial institution, and the 
risk indicators, are shown in figure 2.
 
Figure 2. Calibrating Bank CCA Balance Sheets and Risk 
Indicators
Source: Adapted from Gray and Jones (2006).169 Incorporating Financial Sector Risk into Monetary Policy Models
1.3 A Distance-to-Default Indicator for Chile
The strategy to compute a risk indicator based on the CCA 
model described in the previous sections was applied for Chile. The 
indicator was computed by treating the portfolio of banks in the 
system as one large bank. Since not all banks have shares quoted in 
the stock market, a sample of the largest banks was used, including 
approximately 50 percent of total bank assets, 65 percent of the total 
amount of bonds issued by the banking system, and more than 80 
percent of the market capitalization of the banking industry.9 The 
market capitalization, the volatility of the market capitalization, and 
the default-free value of debt (derived from book values of deposits 
and debt) were then used to simultaneously estimate a time series of 
the implied market value of bank assets and asset volatility (Gray, 
Echeverría, and Luna, 2007).
Although we include 80 percent of bank equity, there could be 
a bias given that we exclude small banks, which could be riskier. 
Nevertheless, when Luna and Gómez (2008) compare an aggregated 
risk indicator with an aggregation of individual indicators, they 
conclude that behavior is very similar in terms of levels and volatility. 
The authors further state that contagion through interbank lending 
would be very limited since it represents a small share of total assets. 
Moreover, the introduction of a real time gross settlement (RTGS) 
system in Chile substantially reduced settlement risks.10 Still, using 
ad hoc methods of aggregating data from different banks can lead to 
mismeasurement of systemic risk, by averaging heterogeneous agents 
and, implicitly, assuming that the measures of different banks’ risks 
are not correlated. Consequently, the methodology should be used 
as a complement to the regular stress tests for banks and adequate 
surveillance analysis of the risks for banks’ financial stability. 
To get a daily estimate of total bank assets, an implicit value 
was obtained by calculating their debt and net worth. Since it is not 
feasible to get the market value of their short- and long-run debt, it is 
common to extract their book value, which, due to current regulation 
in Chile, is very close to the market value—provided there is no 
financial turmoil. Total debt includes monthly information supplied 
9. See Gray, Echeverría, and Luna (2007, table 1).
10. For simplicity, we did not consider explicitely the volatility of foreign debt. 
Nevertheless, in Chile, banks’ foreign debt in the analyzed period represented only 7 
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by the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) 
on short-term debt plus a portion of long-term debt.11
Nevertheless, the volatility of interest rates could imply that 
the market value of debt fluctuates around the book value. These 
fluctuations are higher for longer maturities, which in our calculation 
are less important. To correctly measure the market value of debt 
we would need to have an asset pricing model with two stochastic 
processes, where the interest rates affect the value of bank assets 
and equity. In the current setting, we are implicitly assuming that 
interest rates are nonstochastic. We thus have only one stochastic 
process, namely, bank assets.
On the equity side, daily numbers of shares and their prices for 
the selected banks were obtained from the Santiago Stock Exchange. 
However, we cannot calculate implicit equity volatility from call 
options on bank shares because such derivatives do not exist in 
Chile. We therefore obtained a direct measure of stock volatility 
with a simple model of conditional heteroskedasticity, with a one-
year horizon.12 Recent work on this issue shows that at least for 
the S&P500, the volatility obtained with a similar model is highly 
correlated with the VIX, which is computed based on the implicit 
volatility from options on the stocks included in this index (Alfaro 
and Silva, 2008).
In theory, share prices should equal the present discounted value 
of the flow of dividends. In practice, these prices could also change 
as a result of many factors other than movements in fundamentals, 
namely, abundant liquidity, market overreactions to good news, 
herd behavior, or a different risk assessment than that of the 
authorities.
Despite all the caveats mentioned above, indicators based on 
the behavior of market prices have proved to be good predictors of 
financial stress, risk ratings, and several credit risk indicators.13 
Several studies show that the model is robust, since it correctly 
reflects and anticipates the behavior of other measures of banks’ 
financial fragility, such as risk ratings and various indicators of 
11. A linear transformation of the balance sheet data is performed to generate 
daily data. 
12. Echeverría, Gómez, and Luna (2008) include a detailed analysis of measuring 
distance to default, in which they consider alternative strategies to obtain direct 
volatility.
13. Tudela and Young (2003) find that the distance-to-default measure anticipates 
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portfolio quality.14 Thus, distance to default is still a very good 
complement to the monitoring of systemic risk. 
We use the information on equity and debt to compute the implicit 
value of assets and its volatility with the Black-Scholes-Merton 
system described above, in order to solve the system of nonlinear 
equations for asset and asset volatility (Gray, Merton, and Bodie, 
2006). However, the value of assets and their volatility require the 
calculation of d1 and d2, the latter being an exact measure of distance 
to default (dtd). Therefore, in practice this system is complemented 
by two additional equations, one for d1 and another for d2, and solved 
simultaneously to obtain A0, σA, d1, d2, as well as N(-d2), which 
corresponds to the probability of default. 
An illustrative approximation to dtd could be computed by 
defining it as the difference between the implicit market value of 
assets (A) and the distress barrier (DB), divided by one standard 
deviation of the value of assets: dtd ≈ (A-DB)/AσA. This indicator 
corresponds to the number of standard deviations from the current 
level of assets to the distress barrier, given the level of equity and 
its volatility, the distress barrier, the interest rate, and the period 
analyzed. The larger this indicator, the safer is the banking system. 
It is also possible to compute the probability of default with this 
formula under the assumption that dtd is normally distributed.
Figure 3 shows the time pattern of dtd for the Chilean banking 
system estimated with the Black-Scholes-Merton approach from 1997 
to 2006, along with a three-month moving average.15 The period of 
highest risk for the banking system coincides with the fallout from 
the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) and Russian crises, 
between late 1998 and early 1999. Since then, the Chilean banking 
system has gradually reduced its risk, though this trend appears 
to have leveled off in late 2005.16 Other periods in which markets 
assessed suddenly higher risk for the Chilean banks include the 
14. See Chan-Lau (2006), Chan-Lau and Gravelle (2005), and Chan-Lau, Jobert, 
and Kong (2004).
15. The CCA risk indicators shown in figure 3 are taken from Gray, Echeverría, 
and Luna (2007), who use daily market capitalization for the banks obtained by the 
Central Bank of Chile from the Santiago Stock Exchange. Bank debt was obtained from 
the Central Bank of Chile’s database. Financial practitioners use various methods for 
estimating the volatility of daily asset returns. Two frequently used methods model 
daily volatility either as a GARCH(1,1) or as a moving average process. The GARCH(1,1) 
methodology for all banks in the sample was used in this case, but the results of the 
moving-average model are similar. 
16. This leveling off has occurred at a very low level of risk, as shown below.172 D.F. Gray, C.J. García, L. Luna, and J.E. Restrepo
decline in world stock markets following the collapse of the internet 
bubble in 2000 and the period preceding the Brazilian presidential 
elections in the third quarter of 2002.
Figure 3. Distance to Default for the Banking System
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 3 also illustrates that there is a relation between the 
banking system’s distance to default and both annual GDP growth 
and the output gap. The regressions with output and the output gap as 
the dependent variable, with dtd as one of the independent variables, 
are shown in appendix B. Distance to default has a significant impact 
on both output and the output gap. Other systemic risk indicators are 
described in detail in Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2007, 2008), Goodhart, 
Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2006a, 2006b), Gray and Walsh (2008), Gray 
and Malone (2008), Haldane, Hall, and Pezzini (2007), Segoviano 
(2006), and Segoviano, Goodhart, and Hofmann (2006).
2. linking maCRofinanCe inDiCaToRs To a simple 
DynamiC sToChasTiC maCRoeConomiC poliCy moDel
In this section, we lay out an integrated macrofinance policy 
model in which risk indicators for the financial system as a whole 
are incorporated directly into a macroeconomic policy model. Our 
focus here is on a modular exposition of the parts of the model and 
the equations that make up these parts, as well as giving intuition 
for how they are linked together and can be used for the analysis of 
a wide range of policies.173 Incorporating Financial Sector Risk into Monetary Policy Models
Examples of forward-looking indicators of systemic risk derived 
from the contingent claim analysis (CCA) model are distance to 
default (dtd), expected loss (that is, an implicit put option), or the 
default probability weighted by the assets of individual financial 
institutions. The macroeconomic model used here incorporates the 
CCA risk indicator dtd, whose derivation is described below.17 
The first module of our model consists of equations for the most 
important macroeconomic variables. There is an equation for the 
output gap, an equation for inflation, an equation the real exchange 
rate, a yield curve, and a Taylor rule for setting the domestic policy 
rate, which is a short-term interest rate set by the central bank. The 
second module is used to model distance to default.
Distance to default for the banking system is included in the 
GDP gap equation, the parity condition, and the policy rate reaction 
function. The model parameters are estimated using historical data, 
including the distance-to-distress indicator. Although the equations 
have empirical support (as shown in appendix B), this is mostly 
a theoretical exercise in which some of the model parameters are 
modified (calibrated) to assess how the simulation results change 
with them. The approach can be used to examine the tradeoffs 
between GDP and inflation, with and without the inclusion of 
distance to distress for the banking system in the monetary 
authorities’ reaction function.18
2.1 Module 1: Output, Inflation, the Exchange Rate, 
and a Taylor Rule
The five-equation dynamic stochastic macroeconomic model used 
to set monetary policy was already briefly described. This model, 
which is close to the one by Berg, Karam, and Laxton (2006a, 2006b), 
is a version of the model that was built in the Central Bank of Chile 
17. A related issue is whether an indicator of market risk appetite, such as the 
VIX, should be included in monetary policy models along with the risk indicator. This 
could help estimate the impact of the credit risk indicator on the GDP gap, adjusted for 
changes in risk appetite. In addition, risk indicators for a group of institutions could 
include the correlation, or dependence structure, observed between the institutions.
18. Other interesting routes for linking risk analytics more closely with 
macroeconomic models include incorporating default risk and a risk premium into the 
Mundell-Fleming model to separate out the effects of changes in interest rates resulting 
from changes in the market for liquidity and from changes in the risk premium on debt 
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at the start of the implementation of fully-fledged inflation targeting 
in 2000. An application of it to the design of monetary policy in Chile, 
using efficiency frontiers, is found in García, Herrera, and Valdés 
(2002). It is one example of a class of models that can be used for 
policy analysis in small open economies that, as stated above, are 
empirically motivated (IS/LM type) and at the same time share 
many features of the dynamic stochastic, micro-founded, general 
equilibrium models used by central banks.19
2.1.1 The equation for the output gap
The equation for the output gap is as follows:
ygap ygap ygap ygap ygap r t t t t t t = + + + +
+
+ - - - - β β β β β
β
1 1 2 1 3 2 4 3 5 1
6
( )
(r rl q dtd t t t t
y
- - + + + 2 7 4 8 ) ( ) ( ) , β β ε  
(1)
where ygap corresponds to the output gap (that is, the log deviation 
of GDP with respect to its trend), r is the short-run real interest 
rate, rl is the long-run real interest rate, q is the real exchange 
rate, and dtd is distance to default, which is also modeled here. As 
was explained in detail above, dtd is a financial risk indicator that 
could reflect, in general, the financial conditions that the economy 
faces. Finally, εt
y is a shock to GDP. All variables are expressed as 
log deviations from steady state.
2.1.2 The Phillips curve
The Phillips curve equation is
Δπ α π π π α π π π π t t
e
t t t t t t = + - 


 + + + -  
+
+ - - - - - 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 1 2 3 ( ) ( )
α α π α ε
π
3 1 4 1 4 1 2 3 2 ( ) ( ) , q q ygap ygap t t t t t t - - - - - - -   + +   +  
(2)
where π stands for inflation, πe
t+1 represents inflation expectations 
in the next period, q is the real exchange rate, and επ
t is a cost-push 
shock.
19. See Berg, Karam, and Laxton (2006a, p. 3).175 Incorporating Financial Sector Risk into Monetary Policy Models
2.1.3 The exchange rate equation 
The exchange rate equation is equivalent to the interest parity 
condition:
q q q r rf dtd t t t t t t t
q = + + - + + + - - δ δ δ ε 1 1 2 1 3 1 ( ) ( ) .   (3)
The real exchange rate depends on lags and leads of itself, the 
domestic policy rate (r), the foreign policy rate (rf), and the risk 
indicator, which embeds both the sovereign spread for domestic debt 
and the sovereign spread for foreign debt. According to uncovered 
interest rate parity, the expected change in the spot exchange rate 
should be related to the differential between the domestic and foreign 
interest rates, plus some risk premium. 
The long-run interest rate (yield curve) equation describes 
the relationship between long-run (rlt) and short-run (rt) interest 
rates:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) . rl rl rl r t t
e
t t t
rl = + + - - + + - ξ ξ ξ ξ ε 1 1 2 1 1 2 1       (4)
2.1.4 The reaction function 
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The monetary policy interest rate depends on its own lag, the 
expected inflation gap, the output gap, distance to default, and a 
policy shock. While including a measure of financial stability in the 
Taylor rule for setting interest rates may improve efficiency (welfare), 
especially if financial stability affects output, accurate regulation 
and supervision of financial institutions could be a better way of 
targeting financial stability. 176 D.F. Gray, C.J. García, L. Luna, and J.E. Restrepo
2.2 Module 2: Distance-to-Default Model for the 
Banking System
This module completes the whole system to be simulated 
simultaneously. The value of assets, A, is derived from the Black-
Scholes model, 
A
E B r t N d
N d
=






where E is the value of equity (or the value of the call option), B 
is the value of debt in the Black-Scholes model and here also the 
default barrier, r is the risk-free interest rate, and t is time, which is 
fixed in the model at one year. Finally, N(.) is the normal cumulative 
distribution function, and d1 and d2 were derived from the Black-
Scholes model as described in section 1.1:20




















Note that d2 is equal, precisely, to distance to default (dtd = d2).
It is apparent from equation (8) that asset volatility, σA, and 
assets value, A, are crucial for finding dtd. Thus, the system of 
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(9)
where, σE stands for volatility of equity.21
Bank equity (E) and its volatility (σE) were initially set 
constant, but the results obtained with the model simulations were 
20. Dynare has an explicit function built in for the cumulative normal distribution 
function.
21. Gray and Malone (2008) provide a thorough explanation. 177 Incorporating Financial Sector Risk into Monetary Policy Models
counterintuitive regarding distance to default. After a cost-push 
shock hit the economy, inflation went up as expected, GDP fell, and 
the interest rate increased in reaction to the inflationary pressures. 
While this negative economic scenario was taking place, distance 
to default was growing, signaling a sounder economic situation in 
the banking industry and among businesses in general, which is 
not a sensible outcome. The efficiency frontiers obtained were not 
satisfactory, either. By the same token, after a positive shock to GDP, 
which was accompanied by an interest rate hike, distance to default 
fell as if the economy were more vulnerable. This is so because in 
the model, higher interest rates have a negative effect on the level 
of assets, even if the economy is in better shape.
We therefore adopted a new strategy of modeling both E and its 
volatility, σE. As mentioned earlier, distance to default affects the 
macroeconomic variables in several ways: namely, by affecting GDP, 
the real exchange rate, and the interest rate in equations (1), (3), 
and (5) of the macroeconomic model, respectively. In the following 
equations, GDP affects banks’ capital, E, and its volatility, σE. It 
also affects distance to default through this channel, making the 
whole system of equations completely endogenous. Another channel 
of endogeneity is the effect of interest rate on assets, A, and on the 
volatility of equity, σE:22
E E ygap t t t = + ⋅ -   . ; ρ 1 0 01    (10) 
σE t t t t r ygap ygap ygap = + ⋅ - + + + -   . ( ( ) . 0 1 3 3 1 4 )   (11)
The parameters of the macroeconomic model (see table 1) were 
estimated for carrying out monetary policy analysis. Although, as 
we said above, this is mostly a theoretical exercise in which some of 
the model parameters were calibrated either in the yield curve (ξ) or 
in the reaction function (θ, γ, and ζ), and the parameters related to 
distance to default were calibrated in the interest parity condition 
and the Phillips curve, which are used in the sensitivity analysis of 
the next section. 
22. The spread put is an alternative measure of risk. It is described in 
Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2008) and Gray and Malone (2008) as a function of 
the value of the put option, the default barrier, the risk free rate, and time:   
spread_ put = -1/t•log[1-PUT/BB•exp(-r•t)]-0.00925382. Although the spread put is 
a useful concept, it was not used in the simulations performed with the model here.178 D.F. Gray, C.J. García, L. Luna, and J.E. Restrepo
Table 1. Parameters of the Macroeconomic Model
Parameter Parameter
β1 = 0.1 α3 = 0.05
β2 = –0.1 α4 = 0.15
β3 = –0.6 δ1 = 0.3
β4 = –0.4 δ2 = 0.6
β5 = –0.5 δ3 = –0.04
β6 = –0.5 ξ1 = 0.5
β7 = 0.02 ξ2 = 0.45
β8 = 0.2 ρ = 0.8
α1 = 0.3 θ =1.3
α2 = 0.5 γ = 0.2,0.3,…,1.2
α3 = 0.05 ζ = 0.5,1.0,1.5
Source: Authors’ calculations.
3. sToChasTiC simulaTions anD poliCy analysis
To understand how the model works, we first obtained impulse 
responses (figure 4). We then assess different monetary policy 
alternatives and model calibrations by building efficiency frontiers 
with the volatilities of GDP and inflation (García, Herrera, and 
Valdés, 2002; Laxton and Pesenti, 2003). Specifically, we measure 
the responses of GDP, inflation, the exchange rate, the monetary 
policy interest rate, r, the CCA-derived risk indicator, dtd, and assets 
following a shock of 100 basis points to GDP and inflation. 
Output falls after an inflation shock (cost-push shock) hits the 
economy, taking the output gap (ygap) to negative levels. In contrast, 
the interest rate tends to increase initially; when combined with 
the output gap reduction, this increases financial vulnerability and 
reduces the distance to default significantly (figure 4). The drop 
in the distance to default is so large that an otherwise increasing 
interest rate ends up falling while the exchange rate increases. This 
is so because the exchange rate is not only affected by the interest 
rate, but also by dtd through the risk premium. 179 Incorporating Financial Sector Risk into Monetary Policy Models





A positive shock to the output gap, in turn, causes GDP and 
inflation to increase. Interest rates also increase, while the exchange 
rate falls in line with economic intuition. The system takes around 
four years to return to equilibrium after the shock (figure 5).23
23. A negative shock to distance to default (not reported) causes an initial small 
drop in ygap, but since dtd is included in the policy reaction function, the original 
shock is followed by a reduction in the monetary policy rate. Moreover, arbitrage 
through the uncovered interest parity and the respective hike of the risk premium 
result in a large real depreciation. Thus, the interest rate and the exchange rate fuel 
a GDP expansion.180 D.F. Gray, C.J. García, L. Luna, and J.E. Restrepo





In general, the model works as expected according to standard 
economic intuition. There is strong interaction among macroeconomic 
variables, and dtd has a large impact on the monetary policy rate, 
the real exchange rate, and even the output gap.
The efficiency frontiers are built combining the volatility of 
inflation and GDP that results after the economy is hit repeatedly 
by shocks drawn from a normal distribution. Using Dynare, we 
simulated the artificial economy for 200 periods, repeatedly, 
and computed the average standard deviations of the variables 
between periods 100 and 120 across the repetitions. The purpose 
of the exercise is to compare frontiers that were obtained with a 
combination of ten weights, in the policy rule, for both the inflation 181 Incorporating Financial Sector Risk into Monetary Policy Models
and the output gap objectives, respectively, using three different 
weights on distance to default.24 Additional frontiers are obtained 
using a similar procedure but changing one of the parameters of 
the model. Whenever a frontier is closer to the origin, the volatility 
tradeoff is smaller, and it is possible to say that the policy choice is 
better for the central bank and the society as a whole. 
Figures 6 through 9 all include three frontiers, which were 
obtained with a traditional Taylor rule that includes dtd in addition 
to inflation and GDP gaps (θ = 0.5, ρ = 0.6, and γ = 0.6). The first line 
results from a rule in which dtd has a small weight (with a coefficient 
ζ = 0.5); that is, authorities react only weakly to the risk indicator 
(dotted line). The other lines in the figures correspond to alternative 
reaction functions for monetary policy that have a larger weight of 
dtd, with coefficients ζ equal to 1.0 and 1.5, respectively (dashed and 
solid lines). In summary, besides reacting to inflation and GDP gaps, 
the monetary authority also reacts to distance to default, increasing 
the interest rate when dtd is large, but reducing it when the banking 
system is close to default by more than is warranted by the inflation 
and output gaps alone. This is so because negative shocks to asset 
prices and liquidity could end up in credit risk crises, with systemic 
consequences for lending and production. On the other side, a very 
large dtd could be the result of asset bubbles, which are usually 
associated with financial turmoil when they burst.
3.1 Reaction Size to dtd in the Policy Rule
The size of the reaction to dtd in the Taylor rule has a very 
significant effect on the results. Indeed, the larger the coefficient 
associated with dtd in the authorities’ reaction function, the closer 
to the origin is the frontier obtained with the simulations (solid 
line in figure 6). Therefore, the central bank’s stabilization of dtd 
contributes to stabilizing the volatilities of both GDP and inflation, 
which fall more with a larger coefficient on dtd but with diminishing 
marginal gains. Increasing the coefficient from 0.5 to 1.0 generates 
24. The combination of coefficients on inflation and output starts with 1.2 and 0.1, 
respectively. To get the second combination, the coefficient on inflation declines, while 
the weight on output gap increases—both by 0.1 each time. Therefore, another point 
for the volatility of inflation and output would be obtained with the combination of 1.1 
and 0.2 weights in the monetary policy rule. A third one would be 1.0 and 0.3 and so 
on, up to ten combinations.182 D.F. Gray, C.J. García, L. Luna, and J.E. Restrepo
a large reduction in the volatility of GDP and inflation, while using 
a coefficient of 1.5 improves the trade-off only marginally. 
Figure 6. Efficiency frontiers
  
Source: Authors’ calculations.
3.2 Endogenous Effect on Bank Equity (E ) and Its 
Volatility (σE ) 
This experiment consists of substantially increasing the effect 
of GDP on both bank equity and its volatility. This is implemented 
by augmenting the coefficient of ygap from 0.01 to 0.10 in equation 
(10) and from 1.0 to 1.5 in equation (11). If the feedback from GDP to 
bank equity and dtd (endogeneity) is stronger, the gains by reacting 
strongly to dtd are even larger than in the base model (figure 7). 
In fact, a comparison of the two panels in the figure shows that the 
volatility reduction of both variables, included in the frontier, is 
much larger here than in the base model.
3.3 Effect of dtd on the Real Exchange Rate
In this experiment the effect (coefficient) of dtd in the (risk 
premium) exchange rate equation (3) was increased from 0.04 to 
0.50 (figure 8, panel B). Again, the solid line, which represents 
the frontier obtained with a larger weight on dtd in the reaction 
function, includes points that are closer to the origin than any 
ζ = 0.5
ζ = 1.0
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Figure 7. Efficiency Frontiers and the Endogeneity of 
Bank Equity
A. Base model
B. High endogeneity of bank equity
Source: Authors’ calculations.
point in the dashed or dotted lines. Thus, this policy should be 
preferred by the central bank. The gains in terms of volatility 
are very similar in both panels of figure 8, although panel B only 
shows small differences with respect to the baseline model. The 
shape of the frontiers obtained in this experiment indicates that 
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Figure 8. Efficiency Frontiers and the Interest Parity 
Condition
A. Base model
B. High effect of dtd on the real exchange rate
Source: Authors’ calculations.
3.4 Higher Pass-through
Were the pass-though from exchange rate to inflation larger (0.7 
instead of 0.05), the central bank policy would be more efficient if it 
reacted to dtd. Indeed, by reacting to dtd the central bank is able to 
reduce volatility mostly of output. As shown in figure 9, the frontiers 
move downward whenever the coefficient associated with dtd, in the 
monetary policy rule, increases. A high level of pass-through is an 
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and quickly reflect any movement of the exchange rate, it would be 
more difficult for relative prices to adjust after a shock, which could 
make GDP more volatile too. 





The simulations of the macroeconomic model show that it is more 
efficient for the central bank to put a larger weight on dtd in the 
reaction function, given that inflation and output volatility decrease. 
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including dtd in the reaction function will reduce output volatility 
without increasing the variability of inflation. In addition, whether 
financial vulnerability or dtd has a larger impact on the exchange 
rate, or GDP has a larger effect on bank equity and, through it, on 
dtd (that is, endogeneity is high), it is more efficient to include dtd 
in the reaction function because the central bank is then able to 
reduce the volatility of both inflation and output. 
4. ConClusions
The main objective of this article was the integration of the 
analysis of financial sector vulnerability into macroeconomic models, 
which is an area of important and growing interest for policymakers 
in both developed and emerging markets. This paper uses contingent 
claims analysis tools, developed in finance, to construct financial 
stability indicators in a standard monetary policy model. Financial 
sector risk affects the economy, while the economy (GDP) and interest 
rates affect financial sector credit risk. 
The new framework is simple, but powerful for monetary policy 
analysis. The model incorporates the main variables analyzed by 
policymakers, but it is small enough to facilitate understanding how 
it works. Although the system stochastically simulates an artificial 
economy, the empirical evidence supports the model. In addition, 
impulse responses behave in accordance with economic intuition.
The main question to be answered with the integrated model 
was whether or not the central bank should explicitly include the 
financial stability indicator in the interest rate reaction function. 
The alternative is to react only indirectly to financial risk by 
reacting to inflation and GDP gaps, since they already include the 
effect of financial factors on the economy. To reach the objective, 
efficiency frontiers were built with the volatility of inflation and 
output obtained from stochastic simulations. In general, we find that 
including the distance to default (dtd) in the reaction function reduces 
both inflation and output volatility. Moving the policy interest rate 
more than what is consistent with the inflation and output gaps is 
efficient because negative shocks to asset prices and liquidity could 
lead to credit risk crises, with negative systemic consequences on 
the financial system and GDP.
We also performed a set of exercises in which some of the 
model parameters were calibrated to reflect and assess actual 
differences among economies regarding exchange rate pass-through, 187 Incorporating Financial Sector Risk into Monetary Policy Models
the relation between financial risk and exchange rate through 
the parity condition (risk premium), and the endogeneity of the 
financial indicator, namely, the degree in which the macroeconomic 
variables (GDP and interest rates) affect distance to default through 
bank assets, bank equity, and equity volatility. Whenever the 
pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation is higher, when 
the impact of financial vulnerability (dtd) on the exchange rate is 
larger, and when the effect of GDP on bank equity (endogeneity) is 
stronger, it is more efficient to include dtd in the reaction function, 
with a large coefficient. Finally, this is a first approximation to 
the subject, and considerable refinements and extensions could 
be introduced in the future. A non-exhaustive list includes the 
following: the use of other financial sector risk indicators; the 
inclusion of combinations of financial scenarios (strong, normal, 
fragile); adjustments to the dynamics of the macroeconomic 
model; the adoption of a more micro-founded general equilibrium 
macroeconomic model; and the introduction of empirical evidence 
for other countries or the application of the framework to other 
economies. All these extensions are left for future research.188 D.F. Gray, C.J. García, L. Luna, and J.E. Restrepo
aPPendix a
Extensions of the Merton Model
Numerous extensions of the original Merton model have been 
developed by relaxing some of its assumptions. Restrictions of the 
model include the following assumptions: (i) default can occur only 
at the maturity date of the debt; (ii) there is a fixed default barrier; 
(iii) there is a constant risk-free rate; and, (iv) asset volatility is 
constant. Cossin and Pirotte (2001) provide a good summary of 
extensions of the Merton model. Black and Cox (1976) extended the 
Merton model to relax assumptions (i) and (ii) above by introducing 
a “first passage time” model in which default can occur prior to 
the maturity of the debt if the asset falls below a specified barrier 
function for the first time. 
Although the strict theoretical condition in the Merton model for 
default is that the value of assets is less than the required payments 
due on the debt, in the real world default typically occurs at much 
higher asset values, either because of a material breach of a debt 
covenant or because assets cannot be sold to meet the payments (that 
is, inadequate liquidity) or because the sovereign decides to default and 
induce a debt renegotiation rather than sell assets. To capture these 
real-world conditions for default in the model, we specify a market 
value of total assets at which default occurs. We call this level of assets 
that trigger default the distress barrier. This barrier can be viewed 
as the present value of the promised payments discounted at the 
risk-free rate. The approach used in the KMV model sets the barrier 
level equal to the sum of the book value of short-term debt, promised 
interest payments for the next 12 months, and half of long-term debt 
(see Crouhy, Galai, and Mark, 2000; Crosbie, 1999, 2001). 
In the 1990s, the KMV model was based on the Vasicek and 
Kealhofer model, which has multiple layers of liabilities and several 
confidential features. The Moody’s KMV expected default frequency 
(EDF) credit measure is calculated using an iterative procedure to 
solve for asset volatility. This distance to default was then mapped 
to actual default probabilities using a database of detailed real-world 
default probabilities for many firms. The Moody’s KMV distance to 
default and the cumulative expected default probabilities (CEDF) 
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CEDF f DD t KMV t =   ( ) .
This definition of DDKMV includes the real drift of the asset, µA, 
whereas the distance to default from the Merton approach has r 
for the asset drift. Since Moody’s KMV estimates the actual default 
probabilities, the risk-neutral default probabilities are calculated 
from the correlation of the implied asset with the market, the market 
Sharpe ratio, and the time horizon. 
The Merton model has been extended to include stochastic 
interest rates, as well. Shimko, Tejima, and Van Deventer (1993) 
include a Vasicek interest rate term structure model that relaxes 
assumption (iii) above, allowing the risk-free interest rate to change 
and including the correlation of asset return with the interest rate. 
There are two stochastic factors: the asset and the interest rate. This 
model is frequently called the STV model. Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995) take the Black and Cox (1976) model and add in stochastic 
interest rates, similar to the way STV includes interest rates. 
The CreditGrades model (Finger, 2002) includes a diffusion of a 
firm’s assets and a first passage time default with a stochastic default 
barrier. The model was modified to incorporate equity derivatives 
(Stamicar and Finger, 2005). Recent research studies the relationship 
between the volatility skew implied by equity options and CDS 
spreads (Hull et. al. 2004). They establish a relationship between the 
implied volatility of two equity options, leverage and asset volatility. 
This approach is, in fact, another way of implementing Merton’s 
model to get spreads and risk-neutral default probabilities directly 
from the implied volatility of equity options. Zou (2003) presents a 
similar approach using several equity options. 
Financial support for liquidity and potential credit risk from 
the authorities is likely to be provided before the default barrier 
is reached. A minimum capital barrier, or simply a capital barrier, 
can be defined in addition to the default barrier. For instance, the 
default barrier plus 8 percent of the market value of assets could be 
used as the minimum 8 percent capital barrier. The area between 
the minimum capital barrier and the default barrier represents 
the probability of falling below minimum capital but not as far as 
default. The value of this area is calculated as the implicit put option 
below the minimum capital barrier minus the implicit default put 
option. We call the value of the area the capital barrier put option 
or capital barrier expected loss. This is particularly relevant to the 190 D.F. Gray, C.J. García, L. Luna, and J.E. Restrepo
central bank, as it is a measure of loss directly related to the liquidity 
support and financial support that would be needed to get the bank 
asset level above the minimum capital level. 
 Finally, contingent claims models can be used to assess systemic 
risk in portfolios of financial institutions, including the correlation 
or dependence structure among them. 191 Incorporating Financial Sector Risk into Monetary Policy Models
aPPendix b
Regression Results of Output and the Output Gap on 
the Distance to Default of the Banking System
The first regression is on GDP growth: 
Δyt = a + α1rt-1 + α2 Δdtdt-1 + α3Δet-1 + α4 Δyt-1 + εt.
The results are presented in table B1. The second is a regression 
on the output gap:
ygapt = c + α1 Δdtdt-1 + α2 Δet-3 + α3 ygapt-1 + α4 ygapt-3 + ξt.
The results are presented in B2. These regressions show that 
changes in dtd are significant in explaining both quarterly GDP 
growth (the first equation) and the output gap (the second equation) 
with the expected positive sign. 
Table B1. GDP Growth Regressionsa
Variable Coefficient Standard error t statistic Probability 
Constant 0.011 0.002 4.830 0.000
rt–1 –0.001 0.000 –3.723 0.000
Δet–1 0.046 0.019 2.438 0.017
Δdtdt–1 0.012 0.003 3.551 0.001
Δyt–1 0.463 0.074 6.283 0.000
Summary statistic
R-squared 0.574 Log likelihood 358.890
Adjusted R-squared 0.557 Akaike information criterion –6.677
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.912 Schwarz criterion –6.552
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The dependent variable is Δyt. The adjusted sample covers the period from May 1998 to February 2007 and 
includes 106 observations (after adjustments).192 D.F. Gray, C.J. García, L. Luna, and J.E. Restrepo
Table B2. Output Gap Regressionsa
Variable Coefficient Standard error t statistic Probability 
Constant –1.736 0.470 –3.691 0.000
Δet–3 4.134 1.639 2.522 0.013
Δdtdt–1 0.934 0.256 3.653 0.000
ygapt–1 0.513 0.082 6.275 0.000
ygapt–3 0.225 0.072 3.113 0.002
Summary statistic
R-squared 0.661 Log likelihood –115.126
Adjusted R-squared 0.648 Akaike information criterion 2.204
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.842 Schwarz criterion 2.328
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The dependent variable is ygapt. The adjusted sample covers the period from February 1998 to February 2007 
and includes 109 observations (after adjustments).193 Incorporating Financial Sector Risk into Monetary Policy Models
aPPendix c
Extensions and Further Applications
The central bank may expand its set of policy instruments to 
better accommodate its multiple objectives. Additional tools that can 
be used to target financial stability include the reserve requirements 
for banks and other measures of capital adequacy, such as the value-
at-risk-based measures advocated in Basel II. A rule can be specified 
for targeting such a measure of capital adequacy, C, as follows:
Ct = φ1 Ct-1 + (1 - φ1)(η2ygapt + η3fsigapt) + ε10,t.
The closer the parameter φ1 is to one, the more continuity is built 
into the capital adequacy requirement. As in the case of interest 
rates, some continuity is important, because significant changes in 
capital adequacy requirements, or interest rates, in a short amount 
of time can also potentially contribute to instability, as banks move 
en masse to comply with the new requirements. The second term in 
the above rule, which is multiplied by the coefficient 1 – φ1, allows 
the central bank to use capital adequacy requirements, or other 
variables that affect the risk profile of the banking sector, to respond 
to deviations of inflation, output, and financial stability from their 
targets.25 Because lower capital adequacy requirements stimulate 
lending, they may be able to contribute to higher investment that 
stimulates output when output is below the target. Likewise, more 
stringent capital adequacy requirements can help increase the 
financial stability indicator when it is below the target, by lowering 
the probability of banking sector instability or widespread defaults. 
Finally, the sovereign and the central bank will choose the coefficients 
of their decisions rules to maximize their objective functions. 
25. See Gray and Malone (2008) for details.194 D.F. Gray, C.J. García, L. Luna, and J.E. Restrepo
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